About Us – AMERICAN SOCCER LEAGUE

History of the American Soccer League

The American Soccer League, established in 1921, was the first of four different professional

soccer sports leagues in the United States to use the ASL name. It was formed by the merger of

teams from the National Association Football League and the Southern New England Soccer

League. For several years the ASL’s popularity rivaled the popularity of the National Football

League.^[1] Disputes with the United States Football Association and FIFA, as well as the onset

of the Great Depression, led to the league’s collapse in the spring of 1933.

The original American Soccer League, operating between 1921 and 1933, was the first

significant, viable, professional soccer league in the United States. The league operated

primarily in the Northeastern United States, mainly in the New York metropolitan area,

Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania. The ASL was created by the merger of

several teams from the National Association Football League (NAFBL) and the Southern New

England Soccer League in 1921. The move came from a growing disenchantment with the

mismanagement of the NAFBL as well as the desire by the United States Football Association

(USFA) to create a unified first-division league.^[2] The ASL’s first secretary was Thomas Cahill,

who had founded the United States Football Association and who had been the first head coach

of the U.S. national team.^[1]

By 1924, the combination of excellent pay and a high level of play drew talented overseas

players, especially from Scotland^[3] and England, with 50 European internationals good enough

to play for their national teams playing in the ASL.^[1] This led to a significant amount of

resentment in Europe and threats of sanctions from FIFA, including the possible expulsion of the

USFA.^[4] At the Sixteenth Annual Congress of FIFA on June 4, 1927, the USFA and the other

national associations came to an agreement regarding player transfers which defused the

situation.^[5] The ASL then ran afoul of the USFA when team owners complained that USFA’s

requirement that ASL teams play in the National Challenge Cup created an unnecessary

financial burden. At the time the Challenge Cup ran during the ASL season forcing the ASL

teams to travel long distances by train or bus to play cup games, then return to the Northeast to

play league games. Therefore, the ASL boycotted the 1924 National Challenge Cup. They re-

entered the competition the next year after the USFA reduced its stake in the gate receipts from

33.3% to 15%.

Soccer Wars

However, resentment continued to simmer between the league and governing body. Matters

came to a head in 1928 when the ASL decided to boycott the Challenge Cup again. When three

ASL clubs, most prominently Bethlehem Steel, defied the league and entered the cup anyway,

the ASL suspended them. In response, the USFA and FIFA declared the ASL an “outlaw

league”. This sparked the “Soccer War”.^[6]^[7]^[8] The ASL team owners defied USFA and FIFA,

relying on the league’s reputation to continue to draw players. At first, it seemed as if the ASL

might win; however, USFA then helped bankroll the creation of a new league, the Eastern

Professional Soccer League (ESL), to rival the ASL. The three ex-ASL teams joined with

several teams from the Southern New York Soccer Association (SNYSA) to form the ESL.^[9]

This led to the SNYSA, under the leadership of Nat Agar, owner of the ASL Brooklyn

Wanderers, to leave USFA and ally with the ASL. Despite the alliance between the ASL and

SNYSA, the creation of a competing league caused severe financial strains on the ASL.^[10] The

league finally broke and came into compliance with USFA and FIFA. In the fall of the 1929/30

season, the ESL and ASL merged to form the Atlantic Coast League which began a 1930

spring-fall season. After the summer break, the league was renamed the American Soccer

League and the league finished the fall half of the 1930 season with a different name than it

began the spring half.

However, the Soccer Wars permanently crippled the ASL, and it collapsed at the end of the

1933 spring season. Ironically, while USFA and FIFA “won” the wars and established their pre-

eminence over the ASL, the spectacle of a U.S. athletic association conspiring with a European

organization to undermine a U.S. athletic league alienated many U.S. sports fans by creating an

image of soccer as a sport controlled by foreigners. These fans turned their backs on soccer,

relegating the sport to the position of a minor league, ethnic-based sport for decades to come.

The American Soccer League has been a name used by four different professional soccer

sports leagues in the United States.

∙American Soccer League (1921–33), from 1921 to 1933

∙American Soccer League (1933–83), from 1933 to 1983

∙American Soccer League (1988–89), from 1988 to 1989

∙American Soccer League (2014–17), from 2014 to 2017

Now the American Soccer League has revived bringing back the Golden Years of

American Soccer.

About Us

The American Soccer League (ASL) is a professional men’s soccer league based in the United

States with headquarters in Los Angeles, California. The league was named for but has no

connection to, the original American Soccer League or any of the previous ASL leagues.

ASL’s goal is to eventually achieve U.S. Soccer Division 2 – 3 status, which will consist of

several professional, semi-professional, and non-professional leagues bound together

hierarchically by promotion and relegation.

The American Soccer League will be more than just a league; it will also be a national advocacy

and organization aimed at advancing soccer in the United States through the development of

high-level competitive play and the support of soccer clubs of all ages and genders.

The league will be sanctioned by the United States Specialty Sports Association (USSSA), with

national affiliate members of the United States Soccer Federation, Concacaf, and FIFA.

Mission

It is the mission of the American Soccer League to promote soccer to the public through the

practice of transparency, honesty, and integrity.

The American Soccer League empowers its members to improve both sports and advance

developments.

Providing accurate information that is vital to our members.

Raising societal awareness about the role of coaches, leagues, and players is essential in the

development of players.

Providing state-of-the-art resources to enhance our members’ continuing professional

development.

Educating and influencing legislators, policymakers, regulators, and the public to advance our

vision and mission.

Creating unique opportunities for our members to connect and share with their peers across

practice settings.

The league’s goal is to eventually achieve U.S. Soccer Division 2 and 3 status and consists of

several professional, semi-professional, and non-professional leagues bound together

hierarchically by promotion and relegation.

Summary

The league’s goal is to eventually achieve U.S. Soccer Division 2 and 3 status and consists of

several professional, semi-professional, and non-professional leagues bound together

hierarchically by promotion and relegation.

American Soccer League (ASL) was established to address issues of interest of soccer. To

which to serve equally our members: leagues, coaches, players, educational institutions, allied

associations, and the public; by defending some injustices and monopolies of several

organizations as a national representative of both sports.

Moreover, the organization holds a fully authorized and member of the US Soccer Federation

under the umbrella of the United States Specialty Sports Association (USSSA) and protected by

freedom of assembly and association, US Constitution, and bylaws of the US Soccer

Federation.

Therefore, neither Cal-South, Cal-North, US Club Soccer and/or organization can reject or deny

any of our members to play in any of their sanctioned leagues or tournaments.

US Soccer Ordinance 603 (2) provides in part: “A member of the organization (other than a

professional league) does not discriminate against the participation of players, teams, coaches,

and clubs based on the player, coach, equipment or club membership or affiliation with any

organization. ”

ASL FREEDOM TO ESTABLISH A PROFESSIONAL SOCCER LEAGUE IN THE USA

American Soccer League “ASL is protected under the Constitution of the United States, ASL

has the freedom to establish a professional league in the USA. The First Amendment of the

U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of association, which includes the ability to

form and join organizations, including sports leagues.

Points & Authorities the Right to Association

Freedom of association encompasses both an individual’s right to join or leave groups

voluntarily, the right of the group to take collective action to pursue the interests of its members,

and the right of an association to accept or decline membership based on certain criteria.

Freedom of Association, The Essentials of Human Rightsdescribes the right as coming together

with other individuals to collectively express, promote, pursue and/or defend common interests.

Freedom of Association is both an individual right and a collective right, guaranteed by all

modern and democratic legal systems, including the United States Bill of Rights, article 11 of the

European Convention on Human Rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and

international law, including articles 20 and 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and

article 22 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Declaration on

Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work by the International Labor Organization also

ensures these rights.

Freedom of association is manifested through the right to join a trade union, to engage in free

speech or to participate in debating societies, political parties, or any other club or association,

including religious denominations and organizations, fraternities, and sport clubs and not to be

compelled to belong an association. It is closely linked with freedom of assembly, particularly

under the U.S. Bill of Rights. Freedom of assembly is typically associated with political contexts.

However, (e.g. the U.S. Constitution, human rights instruments, etc.) the right to freedom of

association may include the right to freedom of assembly.

The courts and delegated officers of local jurisdictions may, however, impose restrictions on any

of the rights of a convicted criminal as a condition of a legal stipulation. Rights to freedom of

association and freedom of assembly are waived under certain circumstances, such as a guilty

plea or conviction, restraining orders and probationer’s search and seizure procedures.

Freedom of peaceful assembly, sometimes used interchangeably with the freedom of

association, is the individual right or ability of people to come together and collectively express,

promote, pursue, and defend their collective or shared ideas. The right to freedom of

association is recognized as a human right, a political right and a civil liberty.

The terms freedom of assembly and freedom of association may be used to distinguish between

the freedom to assemble in public places and the freedom to join an association. Freedom of

assembly is often used in the context of the right to protest, while freedom of association is used

in the context of labor rights and in the Constitution of the United States is interpreted to mean

both the freedom to assemble and the freedom to join an association.

The United States Constitution explicitly provides for ‘the right of the people peaceably to

assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances’ in the First Amendment.

Freedom of Association

The freedom of association stands in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

“

Article 20 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

”

Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights also protects the right to freedom of

assembly and association.

Article 11 – Freedom of assembly and association

“

1.Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2.No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.

United States Constitution

While the United States Constitution‘s First Amendment identifies the rights to assemble and to

petition the government, the text of the First Amendment does not make specific mention of a

right to association. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court held in NAACP v. Alabama

(1958) that freedom of association is an essential part of freedom of speech because, in many

cases, people can engage in effective speech only when they join with others.

∙Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964)

∙United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967)

∙Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)

∙NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 898 (1982)

Residual

A club is an association of people united by a common interest or goal. A service club, for

example, exists for voluntary or charitable activities. There are clubs devoted to hobbies and

sports, social activities clubs, political and religious clubs, and so forth.

A voluntary group or union (also sometimes called a voluntary organization, common–

interest association, association, or society) is a group of individuals who enter into an

agreement, usually as volunteers, to form a body (or organization) to accomplish a purpose.

Common examples include trade associations, trade unions, learned societies, professional

associations, and environmental groups.

Membership is not necessarily voluntary: in order for particular associations to function correctly

they might need to be mandatory or at least strongly encouraged, as is common with many

teachers unions in the US. Because of this, some people use the term common-interest

association to describe groups which form out of a common interest, although this term is not

widely used or understood.

Voluntary associations may be incorporated or unincorporated; for example, in the US, unions

gained additional powers by incorporating. In the UK, the terms Voluntary Association or

Voluntary Organization cover every type of group from a small local Residents’ Association to

large Associations (often Registered Charities) with multimillion-pound turnover that run large-

scale business operations (often providing some kind of public service as subcontractors to

government departments or local authorities).

Legal Status

A standard definition of an unincorporated association was given by Lord Justice Lawton in the

English trust law case Conservative and Unionist Central Office v Burrell (1981):

“Unincorporated association” [means] two or more persons bound together for one or more

common purposes, not being business purposes, by mutual undertakings, each having mutual

duties and obligations, in an organization which has rules which identify in whom control of it

and its funds rests and upon what terms and which can be joined or left at will.

In most countries, an unincorporated association does not have separate legal personality, and

few members of the association usually enjoy limited liability. However, in some countries they

are treated as having separate legal personality for tax purposes. However, because of their

lack of legal personality, legacies to unincorporated associations are sometimes subject to

general common law prohibitions against purpose trusts.

Associations that are organized for profit or financial gain are usually called partnerships. A

special kind of partnership is a co-operative which is usually founded on one person—one vote

principle and distributes its profits according to the amount of goods produced or bought by the

members. Associations may take the form of a non-profit organization or they may be not-for-

profit corporations; this does not mean that the association cannot make benefits from its

activity, but all the benefits must be reinvested. Most associations have some kind of document

or documents that regulate the way in which the body meets and operates. Such an instrument

is often called the organization’s bylaws, constitution, regulations, or agreement of association.

Right of Association

“It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and

ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. . . . Of course, it is immaterial

whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic,

religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom

to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.”601 It appears from the Court’s opinions that the

right of association is derivative from the First Amendment guarantees of speech, assembly, and

petition,602 although it has at times been referred to as an independent freedom protected by

the First Amendment.603 The doctrine is a fairly recent construction, the problems associated

with it having previously arisen primarily in the context of loyalty-security investigations of

Communist Party membership, and these cases having been resolved without giving rise to any

separate theory of association.604

Freedom of association as a concept thus grew out of a series of cases in the 1950s and 1960s

in which certain states were attempting to curb the activities of the National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People. In the first case, the Court unanimously set aside a contempt

citation imposed after the organization refused to comply with a court order to produce a list of

its members within the state. “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view,

particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has

more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of

speech and assembly.”605 “[T]hese indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or

association,”606 may be abridged by governmental action either directly or indirectly, wrote

Justice Harlan, and the state had failed to demonstrate a need for the lists which would

outweigh the harm to associational rights which disclosure would produce.

Applying the concept in subsequent cases, the Court, in Bates v. City of Little Rock,607 again

held that the disclosure of membership lists, because of the harm to “the right of association,”

could be compelled only upon a showing of a subordinating interest; ruled in Shelton v.

Tucker608 that, though a state had a broad interest to inquire into the fitness of its school

teachers, that interest did not justify a regulation requiring all teachers to list all organizations to

which they had belonged within the previous five years; again struck down an effort to compel

membership lists from the NAACP;609 and overturned a state court order barring the NAACP

from doing any business within the state because of alleged improprieties.610 Certain of the

activities condemned in the latter case, the Court said, were protected by the First Amendment

and, though other actions might not have been, the state could not infringe on the “right of

association” by ousting the organization altogether.611

A state order prohibiting the NAACP from urging persons to seek legal redress for alleged

wrongs and from assisting and representing such persons in litigation opened up new avenues

when the Court struck the order down as violating the First Amendment.612 “[A]bstract

discussion is not the only species of communication which the Constitution protects; the First

Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental

intrusion. . . . In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving

private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all

government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country. It

is thus a form of political expression. . ..”

“We need not, in order to find constitutional protection for the kind of cooperative, organizational

activity disclosed by this record, whereby Negroes seek through lawful means to achieve

legitimate political ends, subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of

speech, petition or assembly. For there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth

Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity.”613 This decision was followed in

three cases in which the Court held that labor unions enjoyed First Amendment protection in

assisting their members in pursuing their legal remedies to recover for injuries and other

actions. In the first case, the union advised members to seek legal advice before settling injury

claims and recommended particular attorneys;614 in the second the union retained attorneys on

a salaried basis to represent members;615 in the third, the union recommended certain

attorneys whose fee would not exceed a specified percentage of the recovery.616 Justice Black

wrote: “[T]he First Amendment guarantees of free speech, petition, and assembly give railroad

workers the rights to cooperate in helping and advising one another in asserting their rights. . .

.”617

Thus, a right to associate to further political and social views is protected against unreasonable

burdening,618 but the evolution of this right in recent years has passed far beyond the relatively

narrow contexts in which it was born.

Social contacts that do not occur in the context of an “organized association” may be

unprotected, however. In holding that a state may restrict admission to certain licensed dance

halls to persons between the ages of 14 and 18, the Court declared that there is no “generalized

right of ‘social association’ that includes chance encounters in dance halls.”619

In a series of three decisions, the Court explored the extent to which associational rights may be

burdened by nondiscrimination requirements. First, Roberts v. United States Jaycees620 upheld

application of the Minnesota Human Rights Act to prohibit the United States Jaycees from

excluding women from full membership. Three years later in Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v.

Rotary Club of Duarte,621 the Court applied Roberts in upholding application of a similar

California law to prevent Rotary International from excluding women from membership. Then, in

New York State Club Ass’n v. New York City,622 the Court upheld against facial challenge New

York City’s Human Rights Law, which prohibits race, creed, sex, and other discrimination in

places “of public accommodation, resort, or amusement,” and applies to clubs of more than 400

members providing regular meal service and supported by nonmembers for trade or business

purposes. In Roberts, both the Jaycees’ nearly indiscriminate membership requirements and the

state’s compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination against women were important to the

Court’s analysis. The Court found that “the local chapters of the Jaycees are large and basically

unselective groups,” age and sex being the only established membership criteria in

organizations otherwise entirely open to public participation. The Jaycees, therefore, “lack the

distinctive characteristics [e.g., small size, identifiable purpose, selectivity in membership,

perhaps seclusion from the public eye] that might afford constitutional protection to the decision

of its members to exclude women.”623 Similarly, the Court determined in Rotary International

that Rotary Clubs, designed as community service organizations representing a cross section of

business and professional occupations, also do not represent “the kind of intimate or private

relation that warrants constitutional protection.”624 And, in New York City, the fact “that the

antidiscrimination provisions of the Human Rights Law certainly could be constitutionally applied

at least to some of the large clubs, under the Court’s decisions in Rotary and Roberts,” and the

fact that the clubs were “ ‘commercial’ in nature,” helped to defeat the facial challenge.625

Some amount of First Amendment protection is still due such organizations; the Jaycees had

taken public positions on a number of issues, and, the Court in Roberts noted, “regularly

engage[d] in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities worthy of

constitutional protection under the First Amendment. There is, however, no basis in the record

for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization’s

ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.”626

Moreover, the state had a “compelling interest to prevent . . . acts of invidious discrimination in

the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages. . . .”627

Because of the near-public nature of the Jaycees and Rotary Clubs—the Court in Roberts

likening the situation to a large business attempting to discriminate in hiring or in selection of

customers— the cases may be limited in application, and should not be read as governing

membership discrimination by private social clubs.628 In New York City, the Court noted that

“opportunities for individual associations to contest the constitutionality of the Law as it may be

applied against them are adequate to assure that any overbreadth . . . will be curable through

case-by-case analysis of specific facts.”629

When application of a public accommodations law was viewed as impinging on an

organization’s ability to present its message, the Court found a First Amendment violation.

Massachusetts could not require the private organizers of Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade to

allow a group of gays and lesbians to march as a unit proclaiming its members’ gay and lesbian

identity, the Court held in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group.630 To do so would require

parade organizers to promote a message they did not wish to promote. Roberts and New York

City were distinguished as not involving “a trespass on the organization’s message itself.”631

Those cases stood for the proposition that the state could require equal access for individuals to

what was considered the public benefit of organization membership. But even if individual

access to the parade might similarly be mandated, the Court reasoned, the gay group “could

nonetheless be refused admission as an expressive contingent with its own message just as

readily as a private club could exclude an applicant whose manifest views were at odds with a

position taken by the club’s existing members.”632

In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,633 the Court held that application of New Jersey’s public

accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts of America to admit an avowed homosexual as

an adult member violated the organization’s “First Amendment right of expressive

association.”634 Citing Hurley, the Court held that “[t]he forced inclusion of an unwanted person

in a group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person

affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”635 The

Boy Scouts, the Court found, engages in expressive activity in seeking to transmit a system of

values, which include being “morally straight” and “clean.”636 The Court “accept[ed] the Boy

Scouts’ assertion” that the organization teaches that homosexual conduct is not morally

straight.637 The Court also gave “deference to [the] association’s view of what would impair its

expression.”638 Allowing a gay rights activist to serve in the Scouts would “force the

organization to send a message . . . that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a

legitimate form of behavior.”639

Footnotes

601 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958).

602 357 U.S. at 460; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522–23 (1960); United Transportation Union v. State

Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 578–79 (1971); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972).

603 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461, 463 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–30

(1963); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978); Democratic Party v.

Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 121 (1981).

604 See “Maintenance of National Security and the First Amendment,” infra.

605 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).

606 357 U.S. at 461.

607 361 U.S. 516 (1960).

608 364 U.S. 479 (1960).

609 Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).

610 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).

611 377 U.S. at 308, 309.

612 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).

613 371 U.S. at 429–30. Button was applied in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), in which the Court found

foreclosed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments the discipline visited upon a volunteer lawyer for the American

Civil Liberties Union who had solicited someone to use the ACLU to bring suit to contest the sterilization of Medicaid

recipients. Both the NAACP and the ACLU were organizations that engaged in extensive litigation as well as lobbying

and educational activities, all of which were means of political expression. “[T]he efficacy of litigation as a means of

advancing the cause of civil liberties often depends on the ability to make legal assistance available to suitable

litigants.” Id. at 431. “[C]ollective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right

within the protection of the First Amendment.” Id. at 426. However, ordinary law practice for commercial ends is not

given special protection. “A lawyer’s procurement of remunerative employment is a subject only marginally affected

with First Amendment concerns.” Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 459 (1978). See also Bates v. State

Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 376 n.32 (1977), and see the comparison of Ohralik and Bates in Tennessee

Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Academy, 551 U.S. 291, 296–98 (2007) (“solicitation ban was more

akin to a conduct regulation than a speech restriction”).

614 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).

615 United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).

616 United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971).

617 401 U.S. at 578–79. These cases do not, however, stand for the proposition that individuals are always entitled to

representation of counsel in administrative proceedings. See Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473

U.S. 305 (1985) (upholding limitation to $10 of fee that may be paid attorney in representing veterans’ death or

disability claims before VA).

618 E.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907–15 (1982) (concerted activities of group protesting

racial bias); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (denial of official recognition to student organization by public

college without justification abridged right of association). The right does not, however, protect the decision of entities

not truly private to exclude minorities. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1976); Norwood v. Harrison, 413

U.S. 455, 469–70 (1973); Railway Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468

U.S. 609 (1984).

619 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24, 25 (1989). The narrow factual setting—a restriction on adults dancing

with teenagers in public—may be contrasted with the Court’s broad assertion that “coming together to engage in

recreational dancing . . . is not protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 25.

620 468 U.S. 609 (1984).

621 481 U.S. 537 (1987).

622 487 U.S. 1 (1988).

623 468 U.S. at 621.

624 481 U.S. at 546.

625 487 U.S. at 11–12.

626 468 U.S. at 626–27 (citations omitted).

627 468 U.S. at 628.

628 The Court in Rotary rejected an assertion that Roberts had recognized that Kiwanis Clubs are constitutionally

distinguishable, and suggested that a case-by-case approach is necessary to determine whether “the ‘zone of

privacy’ extends to a particular club or entity.” 481 U.S. at 547 n.6.

629 487 U.S. at 15.

630 514 U.S. 334 (1995).

631 515 U.S. at 580.

632 515 U.S. at 580–81.

633 530 U.S. 640 (2000).

634 530 U.S. at 644.

635 530 U.S. at 648.

636 530 U.S. at 650.

637 530 U.S. at 651.

638 530 U.S. at 653.

639 530 U.S. at 653. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69 (2006), the

Court held that the Solomon Amendment’s forcing law schools to allow military recruiters on campus does not violate

the schools’ freedom of expressive association because “[r]ecruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto

campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to become members of the school’s expressive

association. This distinction is critical. Unlike the public accommodations law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment does

not force a law school ‘to accept members it does not desire.’ ” Rumsfeld is discussed below under “Government and

the Power of the Purse.” See also ANDREW KOPPELMAN AND TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO

DISCRIMINATE?: HOW THE CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICAN V. JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF

FREE ASSOCIATION (Yale University Press, 2009).

References

1. Phillips, Brian (9 June 2010). “How soccer almost became a major American sport in the 1920s”. Slate

Magazine. Retrieved 30 December 2021.

2.^ “U.S. Soccer History – 1921”. Archived from the original on 2009-02-03. Retrieved 2014-02-15.

3.^ Found and Lost – A Land of Opportunity, Scots Football Worldwide

4.^ Moving with the Ball: The Migration of Professional Footballers; Pierre Lanfranchi, Matthew Taylor; 2001; ISBN

9781859733073

5.^ Jose, Colin (1998). American Soccer League, 1921–1931. The Scarecrow Press. (ISBN 0-8108-3429-4).

6.^ “U.S. Soccer History – 1929”. Archived from the original on 2007-06-09. Retrieved 2014-02-15.

7.^ The Globe-Times – Bethlehem; Saturday, December 29, 1928

8.^ The Globe-Times – Bethlehem; Saturday, January 26, 1929

9.^ October 26, 1928 Bethlehem Globe

10.^ SPEEDY COLLAPSE OF OUTLAW LOOP FORECAST

11.^ The Ethnic Period: 1933–1960

12.^ Encyclopedia of Ethnicity and Sports in the United States

Trademark

A common law trademark is a trademark established solely through use in commerce in a

specific geographical area. Business names, logos, and phrases that are regularly used–even

though they have never been federally registered–can all be considered common law

trademarks.

Therefore, American Soccer League “ASL” declares ownership of the Names and Logos

pursuant common law trademark and copyright.

of American Soccer League, Trust (“ASL”). The names and logos of ASL teams are registered

and/or common law trademarks of ASL or are used with the permission of their owners. Any

unauthorized use is forbidden.