Points & Authorities the Right to Association


consists of several professional, semi-professional, and non-professional leagues bound together hierarchically by promotion and relegation.

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ASL consists of several professional, semi-professional, and non-professional leagues bound together hierarchically by promotion and relegation.



American Soccer League “ASL is protected under the Constitution of the United States, ASL has the freedom to establish a professional league in the USA. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of association, which includes the ability to form and join organizations, including sports leagues.

Right above the Freedom of Association

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Freedom of association encompasses both an individual’s right to join or leave groups voluntarily, the right of the group to take collective action to pursue the interests of its members, and the right of an association to accept or decline membership based on certain criteria. Freedom of Association, The Essentials of Human Rights describes the right as coming together with other individuals to collectively express, promote, pursue and/or defend common interests. Freedom of Association is both an individual right and a collective right, guaranteed by all modern and democratic legal systems, including the United States Bill of Rights, article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and international law, including articles 20 and 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 22 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work by the International Labor Organization also ensures these rights.

Freedom of association is manifested through the right to join a trade union, to engage in free speech or to participate in debating societies, political parties, or any other club or association, including religious denominations and organizations, fraternities, and sport clubs and not to be compelled to belong an association. It is closely linked with freedom of assembly, particularly under the U.S. Bill of Rights. Freedom of assembly is typically associated with political contexts. However, (e.g. the U.S. Constitution, human rights instruments, etc.) the right to freedom of association may include the right to freedom of assembly.

The courts and delegated officers of local jurisdictions may, however, impose restrictions on any of the rights of a convicted criminal as a condition of a legal stipulation. Rights to freedom of association and freedom of assembly are waived under certain circumstances, such as a guilty plea or conviction, restraining orders and probationer’s search and seizure procedures.

Freedom of peaceful assembly, sometimes used interchangeably with the freedom of association, is the individual right or ability of people to come together and collectively express, promote, pursue, and defend their collective or shared ideas. The right to freedom of association is recognized as a human right, a political right and a civil liberty.

The terms freedom of assembly and freedom of association may be used to distinguish between the freedom to assemble in public places and the freedom to join an association. Freedom of assembly is often used in the context of the right to protest, while freedom of association is used in the context of labor rights and in the Constitution of the United States is interpreted to mean both the freedom to assemble and the freedom to join an association.

The United States Constitution explicitly provides for ‘the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances’ in the First Amendment.

Freedom of Association

The freedom of association stands in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Article 20 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights also protects the right to freedom of assembly and association.

Article 11 – Freedom of assembly and association Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.

United States Constitution

While the United States Constitution’s First Amendment identifies the rights to assemble and to petition the government, the text of the First Amendment does not make specific mention of a right to association. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court held in NAACP v. Alabama (1958) that freedom of association is an essential part of freedom of speech because, in many cases, people can engage in effective speech only when they join with others.

  • Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964)
  • United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967)
  • Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)
  • NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 898 (1982)


club is an association of people united by a common interest or goal. A service club, for example, exists for voluntary or charitable activities. There are clubs devoted to hobbies and sports, social activities clubs, political and religious clubs, and so forth.

voluntary group or union (also sometimes called a voluntary organizationcommon-interest associationassociation, or society) is a group of individuals who enter into an agreement, usually as volunteers, to form a body (or organization) to accomplish a purpose.Common examples include trade associations, trade unions, learned societies, professional associations, and environmental groups.

Membership is not necessarily voluntary: in order for particular associations to function correctly they might need to be mandatory or at least strongly encouraged, as is common with many teachers unions in the US. Because of this, some people use the term common-interest association to describe groups which form out of a common interest, although this term is not widely used or understood.

Voluntary associations may be incorporated or unincorporated; for example, in the US, unions gained additional powers by incorporating. In the UK, the terms Voluntary Association or Voluntary Organization cover every type of group from a small local Residents’ Association to large Associations (often Registered Charities) with multimillion-pound turnover that run large-scale business operations (often providing some kind of public service as subcontractors to government departments or local authorities).

Legal Status

A standard definition of an unincorporated association was given by Lord Justice Lawton in the English trust law case Conservative and Unionist Central Office v Burrell (1981):

“unincorporated association” [means] two or more persons bound together for one or more common purposes, not being business purposes, by mutual undertakings, each having mutual duties and obligations, in an organization which has rules which identify in whom control of it and its funds rests and upon what terms and which can be joined or left at will.

In most countries, an unincorporated association does not have separate legal personality, and few members of the association usually enjoy limited liability. However, in some countries they are treated as having separate legal personality for tax purposes. However, because of their lack of legal personality, legacies to unincorporated associations are sometimes subject to general common law prohibitions against purpose trusts.

Associations that are organized for profit or financial gain are usually called partnerships. A special kind of partnership is a co-operative which is usually founded on one person—one vote principle and distributes its profits according to the amount of goods produced or bought by the members. Associations may take the form of a non-profit organization or they may be not-for-profit corporations; this does not mean that the association cannot make benefits from its activity, but all the benefits must be reinvested. Most associations have some kind of document or documents that regulate the way in which the body meets and operates. Such an instrument is often called the organization’s bylaws, constitution, regulations, or agreement of association.

Right of Association

“It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. . . . Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.”601 It appears from the Court’s opinions that the right of association is derivative from the First Amendment guarantees of speech, assembly, and petition,602 although it has at times been referred to as an independent freedom protected by the First Amendment.603 The doctrine is a fairly recent construction, the problems associated with it having previously arisen primarily in the context of loyalty-security investigations of Communist Party membership, and these cases having been resolved without giving rise to any separate theory of association.604

Freedom of association as a concept thus grew out of a series of cases in the 1950s and 1960s in which certain states were attempting to curb the activities of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. In the first case, the Court unanimously set aside a contempt citation imposed after the organization refused to comply with a court order to produce a list of its members within the state. “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”605 “These indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association,”606 may be abridged by governmental action either directly or indirectly, wrote Justice Harlan, and the state had failed to demonstrate a need for the lists which would outweigh the harm to associational rights which disclosure would produce.

Applying the concept in subsequent cases, the Court, in Bates v. City of Little Rock,607 again held that the disclosure of membership lists, because of the harm to “the right of association,” could be compelled only upon a showing of a subordinating interest; ruled in Shelton v. Tucker608 that, though a state had a broad interest to inquire into the fitness of its school teachers, that interest did not justify a regulation requiring all teachers to list all organizations to which they had belonged within the previous five years; again struck down an effort to compel membership lists from the NAACP;609 and overturned a state court order barring the NAACP from doing any business within the state because of alleged improprieties.610 Certain of the activities condemned in the latter case, the Court said, were protected by the First Amendment and, though other actions might not have been, the state could not infringe on the “right of association” by ousting the organization altogether.611

A state order prohibiting the NAACP from urging persons to seek legal redress for alleged wrongs and from assisting and representing such persons in litigation opened up new avenues when the Court struck the order down as violating the First Amendment.612 “[A]bstract discussion is not the only species of communication which the Constitution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion. . . . In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of political expression. . . .”

“We need not, in order to find constitutional protection for the kind of cooperative, organizational activity disclosed by this record, whereby Negroes seek through lawful means to achieve legitimate political ends, subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly. For there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity.”613 This decision was followed in three cases in which the Court held that labor unions enjoyed First Amendment protection in assisting their members in pursuing their legal remedies to recover for injuries and other actions. In the first case, the union advised members to seek legal advice before settling injury claims and recommended particular attorneys;614 in the second the union retained attorneys on a salaried basis to represent members;615 in the third, the union recommended certain attorneys whose fee would not exceed a specified percentage of the recovery.616 Justice Black wrote: “[T]he First Amendment guarantees of free speech, petition, and assembly give railroad workers the rights to cooperate in helping and advising one another in asserting their rights. . . .”617

Thus, a right to associate to further political and social views is protected against unreasonable burdening,618 but the evolution of this right in recent years has passed far beyond the relatively narrow contexts in which it was born.

Social contacts that do not occur in the context of an “organized association” may be unprotected, however. In holding that a state may restrict admission to certain licensed dance halls to persons between the ages of 14 and 18, the Court declared that there is no “generalized right of ‘social association’ that includes chance encounters in dance halls.”619

In a series of three decisions, the Court explored the extent to which associational rights may be burdened by nondiscrimination requirements. First, Roberts v. United States Jaycees620 upheld application of the Minnesota Human Rights Act to prohibit the United States Jaycees from excluding women from full membership. Three years later in Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte,621 the Court applied Roberts in upholding application of a similar California law to prevent Rotary International from excluding women from membership. Then, in New York State Club Ass’n v. New York City,622 the Court upheld against facial challenge New York City’s Human Rights Law, which prohibits race, creed, sex, and other discrimination in places “of public accommodation, resort, or amusement,” and applies to clubs of more than 400 members providing regular meal service and supported by nonmembers for trade or business purposes. In Roberts, both the Jaycees’ nearly indiscriminate membership requirements and the state’s compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination against women were important to the Court’s analysis. The Court found that “the local chapters of the Jaycees are large and basically unselective groups,” age and sex being the only established membership criteria in organizations otherwise entirely open to public participation. The Jaycees, therefore, “lack the distinctive characteristics [e.g., small size, identifiable purpose, selectivity in membership, perhaps seclusion from the public eye] that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women.”623 Similarly, the Court determined in Rotary International that Rotary Clubs, designed as community service organizations representing a cross section of business and professional occupations, also do not represent “the kind of intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional protection.”624 And, in New York City, the fact “that the antidiscrimination provisions of the Human Rights Law certainly could be constitutionally applied at least to some of the large clubs, under the Court’s decisions in Rotary and Roberts,” and the fact that the clubs were “ ‘commercial’ in nature,” helped to defeat the facial challenge.625

Some amount of First Amendment protection is still due such organizations; the Jaycees had taken public positions on a number of issues, and, the Court in Roberts noted, “regularly engage[d] in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under the First Amendment. There is, however, no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization’s ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.”626 Moreover, the state had a “compelling interest to prevent . . . acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages. . . .”627

Because of the near-public nature of the Jaycees and Rotary Clubs—the Court in Roberts likening the situation to a large business attempting to discriminate in hiring or in selection of customers— the cases may be limited in application, and should not be read as governing membership discrimination by private social clubs.628 In New York City, the Court noted that “opportunities for individual associations to contest the constitutionality of the Law as it may be applied against them are adequate to assure that any overbreadth . . . will be curable through case-by-case analysis of specific facts.”629

When application of a public accommodations law was viewed as impinging on an organization’s ability to present its message, the Court found a First Amendment violation. Massachusetts could not require the private organizers of Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade to allow a group of gays and lesbians to march as a unit proclaiming its members’ gay and lesbian identity, the Court held in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group.630 To do so would require parade organizers to promote a message they did not wish to promote. Roberts and New York City were distinguished as not involving “a trespass on the organization’s message itself.”631 Those cases stood for the proposition that the state could require equal access for individuals to what was considered the public benefit of organization membership. But even if individual access to the parade might similarly be mandated, the Court reasoned, the gay group “could nonetheless be refused admission as an expressive contingent with its own message just as readily as a private club could exclude an applicant whose manifest views were at odds with a position taken by the club’s existing members.”632

In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,633 the Court held that application of New Jersey’s public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts of America to admit an avowed homosexual as an adult member violated the organization’s “First Amendment right of expressive association.”634 Citing Hurley, the Court held that “[t]he forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”635 The Boy Scouts, the Court found, engages in expressive activity in seeking to transmit a system of values, which include being “morally straight” and “clean.”636 The Court “accept[ed] the Boy Scouts’ assertion” that the organization teaches that homosexual conduct is not morally straight.637 The Court also gave “deference to [the] association’s view of what would impair its expression.”638 Allowing a gay rights activist to serve in the Scouts would “force the organization to send a message . . . that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”639


601 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958). 

602 357 U.S. at 460; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522–23 (1960); United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 578–79 (1971); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972). 

603 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461, 463 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1963); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978); Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 121 (1981). 

604 See “Maintenance of National Security and the First Amendment,” infra

605 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 

606 357 U.S. at 461. 

607 361 U.S. 516 (1960). 

608 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 

609 Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). 

610 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964). 

611 377 U.S. at 308, 309. 

612 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 

613 371 U.S. at 429–30. Button was applied in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), in which the Court found foreclosed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments the discipline visited upon a volunteer lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union who had solicited someone to use the ACLU to bring suit to contest the sterilization of Medicaid recipients. Both the NAACP and the ACLU were organizations that engaged in extensive litigation as well as lobbying and educational activities, all of which were means of political expression. “[T]he efficacy of litigation as a means of advancing the cause of civil liberties often depends on the ability to make legal assistance available to suitable litigants.” Id. at 431. “[C]ollective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.” Id. at 426. However, ordinary law practice for commercial ends is not given special protection. “A lawyer’s procurement of remunerative employment is a subject only marginally affected with First Amendment concerns.” Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 459 (1978). See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 376 n.32 (1977), and see the comparison of Ohralik and Bates in Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Academy, 551 U.S. 291, 296–98 (2007) (“solicitation ban was more akin to a conduct regulation than a speech restriction”). 

614 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). 

615 United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967). 

616 United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971). 

617 401 U.S. at 578–79. These cases do not, however, stand for the proposition that individuals are always entitled to representation of counsel in administrative proceedings. See Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (upholding limitation to $10 of fee that may be paid attorney in representing veterans’ death or disability claims before VA). 

618 E.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907–15 (1982) (concerted activities of group protesting racial bias); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (denial of official recognition to student organization by public college without justification abridged right of association). The right does not, however, protect the decision of entities not truly private to exclude minorities. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1976); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469–70 (1973); Railway Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 

619 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24, 25 (1989). The narrow factual setting—a restriction on adults dancing with teenagers in public—may be contrasted with the Court’s broad assertion that “coming together to engage in recreational dancing . . . is not protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 25. 

620 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 

621 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 

622 487 U.S. 1 (1988). 

623 468 U.S. at 621. 

624 481 U.S. at 546. 

625 487 U.S. at 11–12. 

626 468 U.S. at 626–27 (citations omitted). 

627 468 U.S. at 628. 

628 The Court in Rotary rejected an assertion that Roberts had recognized that Kiwanis Clubs are constitutionally distinguishable, and suggested that a case-by-case approach is necessary to determine whether “the ‘zone of privacy’ extends to a particular club or entity.” 481 U.S. at 547 n.6. 

629 487 U.S. at 15. 

630 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 

631 515 U.S. at 580. 

632 515 U.S. at 580–81. 

633 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 

634 530 U.S. at 644. 

635 530 U.S. at 648. 

636 530 U.S. at 650. 

637 530 U.S. at 651. 

638 530 U.S. at 653. 

639 530 U.S. at 653. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69 (2006), the Court held that the Solomon Amendment’s forcing law schools to allow military recruiters on campus does not violate the schools’ freedom of expressive association because “[r]ecruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to become members of the school’s expressive association. This distinction is critical. Unlike the public accommodations law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment does not force a law school ‘to accept members it does not desire.’ ” Rumsfeld is discussed below under “Government and the Power of the Purse.” See also ANDREW KOPPELMAN AND TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE?: HOW THE CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICAN V. JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF FREE ASSOCIATION (Yale University Press, 2009). 


  1. Phillips, Brian (9 June 2010). “How soccer almost became a major American sport in the 1920s”. Slate Magazine. Retrieved 30 December 2021.
    1. ^ “U.S. Soccer History – 1921”. Archived from the original on 2009-02-03. Retrieved 2014-02-15.^ Found and Lost – A Land of Opportunity, Scots Football Worldwide^ Moving with the Ball: The Migration of Professional Footballers; Pierre Lanfranchi, Matthew Taylor; 2001; ISBN 9781859733073^ Jose, Colin (1998). American Soccer League, 1921–1931. The Scarecrow Press. (ISBN 0-8108-3429-4).^ “U.S. Soccer History – 1929”. Archived from the original on 2007-06-09. Retrieved 2014-02-15.^ The Globe-Times – Bethlehem; Saturday, December 29, 1928^ The Globe-Times – Bethlehem; Saturday, January 26, 1929^ October 26, 1928 Bethlehem Globe^ SPEEDY COLLAPSE OF OUTLAW LOOP FORECAST^ The Ethnic Period: 1933–1960
    1. ^ Encyclopedia of Ethnicity and Sports in the United States



    La constitución mexicana garantiza la libertad para establecer empresas y organizaciones. La constitución mexicana protege este derecho. El artículo 5 de la Constitución Mexicana establece que toda persona tiene derecho al libre desarrollo de su personalidad, y ello incluye la libertad para ejercer actividades económicas lícitas, constituir negocios, ligas y organizaciones, y realizar actividades industriales, comerciales o de servicios, Adicionalmente, el artículo 9 garantiza el derecho a la libre asociación para cualquier fin lícito.



    De acuerdo con la Constitución Mexicana, los mexicanos tienen derecho a la libertad de asociación ya la libertad de constituir organizaciones. El artículo 9 de la Constitución protege explícitamente el derecho de las personas a asociarse libremente con otras para fines lícitos. Esto incluye la libertad de formar partidos políticos, sindicatos, clubes sociales y otros tipos de organizaciones.


    El ordenamiento jurídico mexicano brinda mayor protección a estos derechos a través de diversas leyes y reglamentos. La Ley Federal de Asociaciones garantiza el derecho a establecer organizaciones sin fines de lucro, las cuales pueden crearse para una amplia gama de propósitos, incluyendo actividades sociales, culturales, educativas y filantrópicas. Esta ley establece los requisitos para formar tales organizaciones y establece sus derechos y obligaciones legales.


    Además, el derecho a la libertad de asociación también está protegido por leyes y acuerdos internacionales de los que México es parte. México es miembro de las Naciones Unidas y ha ratificado varios tratados internacionales, incluido el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos. Este tratado reconoce el derecho a la libertad de asociación como un derecho humano fundamental, garantizando a las personas el derecho a formar y afiliarse libremente a asociaciones.


    Las normas internacionales de derechos humanos exigen que cualquier restricción al derecho a la libertad de asociación sea necesaria, proporcionada y prescrita por la ley. En general, se entiende que pueden imponerse limitaciones a este derecho para proteger la seguridad pública, la seguridad nacional o el orden público, pero estas restricciones no deben ser arbitrarias ni discriminatorias.


    En resumen, tanto la Constitución Mexicana como las leyes internas salvaguardan los derechos de los mexicanos a la libertad de asociación y la libertad de constituir organizaciones. Estos derechos también están protegidos por las normas internacionales de derechos humanos, lo que garantiza que las personas puedan asociarse libremente con otras para fines lícitos, incluida la formación de partidos políticos, sindicatos y organizaciones sin fines de lucro.


    Según el derecho internacional, la libertad de asociación y la libertad de establecer son derechos humanos fundamentales que garantizan el derecho de las personas a formar y afiliarse a asociaciones, organizaciones y sindicatos, y establecer empresas, fundaciones y otras entidades. Estos derechos están protegidos por varios instrumentos y convenciones legales internacionales.


    La libertad de asociación se refiere al derecho de los individuos a formar y afiliarse a asociaciones voluntariamente, sin interferencia del estado u otras entidades. Abarca el derecho a crear, participar o disolver asociaciones, incluidos partidos políticos, sindicatos, organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG) y grupos sociales o profesionales. Esta libertad permite a las personas perseguir colectivamente objetivos comunes, expresar sus opiniones y defender sus derechos e intereses.


    De manera similar, la libertad de establecer garantiza el derecho de las personas a establecer y operar varios tipos de entidades, como empresas, fundaciones y organizaciones sin fines de lucro. Incluye el derecho a participar en actividades económicas, crear puestos de trabajo y contribuir al desarrollo social.


    Estos derechos están protegidos por varios instrumentos jurídicos internacionales. La Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (DUDH) reconoce la libertad de asociación y el derecho a formar y afiliarse a sindicatos en el Artículo 20. El Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (PIDCP) protege aún más estos derechos en los Artículos 21 y 22, enfatizando la derecho a la reunión pacífica y la libertad de asociación. Además, los convenios de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) protegen los derechos de los trabajadores a formar y afiliarse a sindicatos.


    Los Estados tienen la obligación de respetar, proteger y cumplir estos derechos. Deben abstenerse de interferir con la libertad de asociación o establecimiento de las personas, a menos que sea necesario y proporcionado por razones legítimas como la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la protección de los derechos de los demás. Cualquier restricción impuesta debe ser prescrita por la ley, necesaria y sujeta a revisión judicial.


    En conclusión, la libertad de asociación y la libertad de establecer son derechos esenciales protegidos por el derecho internacional. Permiten a las personas formar asociaciones, sindicatos y otras entidades, fomentando la participación, la acción colectiva y la búsqueda de objetivos comunes. Los Estados tienen el deber de defender y proteger estos derechos, asegurando que las personas puedan ejercerlos sin interferencias injustificadas.


    La libertad de asociación se encuentra en la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos:


    Artículo 20 (1) Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de reunión y asociación pacíficas. (2) Nadie puede ser obligado a pertenecer a una asociación.


    El artículo 11 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos también protege el derecho a la libertad de reunión y asociación.


    Artículo 11 – Libertad de reunión y asociación Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de reunión pacífica y a la libertad de asociación con otras personas, incluido el derecho a formar sindicatos y afiliarse a ellos para la protección de sus intereses. No se impondrán restricciones a la ejercicio de estos derechos distintos de los prescritos por la ley y que sean necesarios en una sociedad democrática en interés de la seguridad nacional o pública, para la prevención del desorden o el delito, para la protección de la salud o la moral o para la protección del derechos y libertades de los demás. Este artículo no impedirá la imposición de restricciones legales al ejercicio de estos derechos por parte de los miembros de las fuerzas armadas, de la policía o de la administración del Estado.


    Liga Profesional de Futbol Mexicano